Mod­ern Wars Are Wars of Attri­tion

Modern Wars Are Wars of Attrition

For­eign Affairs

Mod­ern Wars Are Wars of Attri­tion

Quick con­clu­sions are the excep­tion, not the rule.

Cred­it: image via Shut­ter­stock

“Bat­tles,” Carl Von Clause­witz said, “decide every­thing.” Yet the famed Pruss­ian mil­i­tary the­o­rist is wrong. Great bat­tles and bril­liant lead­ers can shape the course of events. But often it is attri­tion that is deci­sive in mod­ern war­fare. As Stal­in observed in the wake of the Sec­ond World War, “Hitler’s gen­er­als, raised on the dog­ma of Clause­witz and Moltke,” lost because they “could not under­stand that wars are won in the fac­to­ries.”

Too often the his­to­ry of war­fare is reduced to names and dates. Pop­u­lar thought empha­sizes mil­i­tary engage­ments, from Water­loo to Ver­dun and beyond, and it often under­scores famous gen­er­als and admi­rals, from Napoleon to Robert E. Lee. Bat­tles can be turn­ing points, and lead­er­ship does mat­ter. But as the his­to­ri­an Cathal Nolan con­vinc­ing­ly argued in his 2019 book The Allure of Bat­tle: A His­to­ry of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost, they are sel­dom deci­sive. Indeed, for all their bril­liance, famous com­man­ders like Napoleon and Lee both ulti­mate­ly lost. 

Auster­litz was a tri­umph for Napoleon, and the Sev­en Days Bat­tles right­ly con­tributed to Lee’s leg­end. But in the end, bat­tle­field bril­liance wasn’t enough to over­come greater forces, be it via coali­tion or oth­er­wise, mar­shaled against both men.  “Exhaus­tion of morale and mate­r­i­al rather than final­i­ty through bat­tles marks the endgame of many wars,” Nolan observes. This has long been the case, he notes.

“Many who won huge­ly lop­sided bat­tles went on to lose the wars of which they were apart: Han­ni­bal won at Can­nae; Napoleon at Ulm; Hitler’s panz­er armies took 650,000 pris­on­ers out­side of Kiev in 1941, yet all three went down to defeat.” But “in each case, strate­gic loss­es came after pro­tract­ed attri­tion­al wars against ene­mies who refused to accept those ear­li­er tac­ti­cal out­comes as deci­sive in the greater con­flict.”

Quick wars and con­clu­sive vic­to­ries, such as Israel’s 1967 Six-Day War, are the excep­tion. Indeed, even in that instance, while Israel was able to defeat the numer­i­cal­ly supe­ri­or Arab armies in less than a week, it took two addi­tion­al con­flicts, the War of Attri­tion and the 1973 Yom Kip­pur War, before the f …