Biden’s Lega­cy of Unprin­ci­pled Stag­na­tion

Biden’s Legacy of Unprincipled Stagnation

Biden’s Lega­cy of Unprin­ci­pled Stag­na­tion

The 46th pres­i­dent mixed for­eign weak­ness with domes­tic feck­less­ness to make his admin­is­tra­tion an era-defin­ing bad exam­ple.

Donald Trump And Joe Biden Participate In First Presidential Debate

Joe Biden assumed the pres­i­den­cy repeat­ing the bumper-stick­er phrase, “Amer­i­ca is Back,” by which he meant a “glo­ri­ous restora­tion” of Amer­i­can primacy—a spir­it­ed return to the pre-Trump, post-Cold War for­eign poli­cies the world had come to expect of a benign hege­mon duti­ful­ly man­ag­ing its rules-based inter­na­tion­al order in the inter­est of the world com­mu­ni­ty. The self-pro­claimed essence of Biden’s for­eign pol­i­cy, in the words of Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Advi­sor Jake Sul­li­van, was to “sus­tain the country’s core advan­tages in geopo­lit­i­cal com­pe­ti­tion” and “ral­ly the world to address transna­tion­al chal­lenges from cli­mate change and glob­al health to food secu­ri­ty and inclu­sive eco­nom­ic growth.” 

Four years lat­er, Joe Biden’s for­eign pol­i­cy lega­cy is best char­ac­ter­ized as a series of strate­gic mis­steps and pol­i­cy deci­sions that have dimin­ished Amer­i­can influ­ence abroad, exac­er­bat­ed region­al con­flicts, and intro­duced sig­nif­i­cant risks to Amer­i­can nation­al secu­ri­ty and inter­na­tion­al sta­bil­i­ty. Biden’s for­eign pol­i­cy has been reac­tive rather than proac­tive, often extend­ing con­flicts rather than resolv­ing them, as seen in Ukraine and the Mid­dle East.

Giv­en that Biden sold him­self to the Amer­i­can peo­ple as a leader with half a cen­tu­ry of expe­ri­ence, why might this be the case? Pri­mar­i­ly because the Biden admin­is­tra­tion (and Biden him­self) have lacked a dis­cernible set of val­ues or a grand strat­e­gy. Their notion of the nation­al inter­est has been vague to nonex­is­tent. This has result­ed in a series of reac­tive deci­sions aimed at des­per­ate­ly try­ing to main­tain the sta­tus quo. Biden’s lack of strate­gic vision has been par­tic­u­lar­ly evi­dent in his incon­sis­tent han­dling of alliances, and in the fail­ure to robust­ly address the strate­gic chal­lenges posed by Chi­na and Iran. Fur­ther, oper­a­tional fail­ures, such as the Afghan with­draw­al, and poli­cies like the open bor­der ini­tia­tive, not only had domes­tic reper­cus­sions but also affect­ed U.S. for­eign rela­tions, sig­nal­ing pol­i­cy approach­es that failed to effec­tive­ly adapt to the evolv­ing world order and pro­mote Amer­i­can inter­ests on the world stage. 

This reac­tive stance, with­out guid­ing prin­ci­ples or long-term goals, has left the Unit­ed States lurch­ing from one cri­sis to anoth­er, attempt­ing to patch up sit­u­a­tions rather than mov­ing them towards a coher­ent end-state, thus con­tribut­ing to a lega­cy of pol­i­cy inco­her­ence and missed oppor­tu­ni­ties. It is a for­eign pol­i­cy of “steril­i­ty and stag­na­tion, of… bold­ness where it ought to be restrained, of… weak­ness where it ought to be strong, of… mil­i­ta­riza­tion where it is mil­i­tar­i­ly use­less and polit­i­cal­ly self-defeat­ing, and of… defense of an inde­fen­si­ble sta­tus quo”—phrases that Hans Mor­gen­thau used to define Dwight Eisenhower’s for­eign pol­i­cy in late 1958, but which more accu­rate­ly describe the past four years.

The botched with­draw­al oper­a­tions from Afghanistan in 2021 was Biden’s first major for­eign pol­i­cy fail­ure. While the deci­sion to end the U.S. mil­i­tary pres­ence after near­ly two decades of con­flict and the defeat of al-Qae­da was not a mis­take, the man­ner in which the with­draw­al was executed—which left the coun­try in the hands of the Taliban—undermined its strate­gic log­ic. The Biden administration’s deci­sion to with­draw was exe­cut­ed with such dis­ar­ray and chaos that it left behind 13 dead ser­vice­mem­bers and bil­lions in mil­i­tary hard­ware for the Tal­iban. This deba­cle not only tar­nished the image of the U.S. but also left allies skep­ti­cal of Amer­i­can fore­sight and com­pe­tence.

In Ukraine, the Biden administration’s pol­i­cy has been one of per­pet­u­a­tion rather than res­o­lu­tion. Despite com­mit­ting over $175 bil­lion in aid—and an addi­tion­al $50 bil­lion in loans that will nev­er be repaid, announced in Decem­ber 2024—there seems to be no plau­si­ble Ukrain­ian vic­to­ry on the hori­zon. This sup­port has para­dox­i­cal­ly fueled a war that has led to immense human suf­fer­ing, strate­gic overex­ten­sion, and a dan­ger­ous esca­la­tion of con­flict with Rus­sia, as well as dan­gling an absurd promise of even­tu­al Ukrain­ian admis­sion to NATO. The administration’s refusal to seek or encour­age peace nego­ti­a­tions only adds to the nar­ra­tive of a pol­i­cy that is more about pro­long­ing con­flict than achiev­ing peace. 

It is worth recall­ing that promi­nent real­ists called for a nego­ti­at­ed set­tle­ment, before the West’s efforts became not about the free­dom of Ukraine but a war against Rus­sia itself—a war that, in Hen­ry Kissinger’s words to the World Eco­nom­ic Forum in May 2022, would need­less­ly cre­ate “upheavals and ten­sions that will not be eas­i­ly over­come.” Con­trary to such advice, Biden declared that “Putin can­not remain in pow­er,” with Defense Sec­re­tary Lloyd Austin adding that America’s aim should be to “per­ma­nent­ly weak­en” Rus­sia. Por­tray­ing the con­flict as a stark choice between a sys­tem of shared respon­si­bil­i­ty for secu­ri­ty ver­sus a sys­tem of pow­er rival­ry and spheres of influ­ence, Sec­re­tary of State Antony Blinken announced that the admin­is­tra­tion would not dis­cuss Russ­ian con­cerns over Ukrain­ian mem­ber­ship in NATO, for “one coun­try does not have the right to exert a sphere of influ­ence. That notion should be rel­e­gat­ed to the dust­bin of his­to­ry.” Iron­i­cal­ly, the Biden admin­is­tra­tion con­tin­ued to treat the entire world as an Amer­i­can sphere of influ­ence, fail­ing to accept lim­its on U.S. pow­er after unipo­lar­i­ty. 

And just as his admin­is­tra­tion was near­ing its end, and despite promis­es that he would not “send to Ukraine rock­et sys­tems that can strike into Rus­sia,” Biden autho­rized the use of Amer­i­can-pro­vid­ed ATACMS mis­siles for deep strikes inside Rus­sia, embrac­ing a pol­i­cy of dan­ger­ous esca­la­tion in an already tense sit­u­a­tion. (Recall that sev­en months into the war, the U.S. intel­li­gence com­mu­ni­ty warned of a 50 per­cent chance of Russ­ian use of tac­ti­cal nuclear weapons if Russ­ian forces were on the verge of defeat in Kher­son.) If that weren’t bad enough, ship­ments of U.S. muni­tions have like­wise cre­at­ed crit­i­cal short­ages in U.S. stock­piles and lim­it­ed our options for send­ing aid to oth­er part­ners, like Israel and Tai­wan. Addi­tion­al­ly, the Biden admin­is­tra­tion has failed to con­sid­er the broad­er geopo­lit­i­cal con­se­quences of its pol­i­cy in Ukraine, par­tic­u­lar­ly the strength­en­ing of the Rus­sia-Chi­na axis. Russia’s increas­ing­ly close ties with Chi­na, North Korea, and Iran are a direct result of the ongo­ing war and the West’s con­tin­ued sup­port for Ukraine. This has shift­ed the bal­ance of pow­er in Eura­sia, mak­ing it more dif­fi­cult for the Unit­ed States to con­tain Chi­na and Rus­sia simul­ta­ne­ous­ly.

Biden’s approach to Chi­na and the broad­er Indo-Pacif­ic region has been equal­ly mud­dled. The administration’s fre­quent use of the terms “guardrails,” “red lines,” and “steer­ing” to describe U.S.–China rela­tions sug­gests a “Driver’s Man­u­al” method for craft­ing inde­ci­sive Amer­i­can for­eign poli­cies. There has been no clear strat­e­gy beyond eco­nom­ic sanc­tions and mil­i­tary pos­tur­ing. While there have been token men­tions of eco­nom­ic decou­pling and mil­i­tary com­pe­ti­tion, the admin­is­tra­tion has failed to artic­u­late a cohe­sive, long-term strat­e­gy for deal­ing with China’s ris­ing influ­ence and mil­i­tary assertive­ness. Incon­sis­tent mes­sag­ing on Tai­wan has com­pound­ed the prob­lem, as the Unit­ed States has vac­il­lat­ed between sup­port­ing Taiwan’s right to self-defense and warn­ing of the risks of pro­vok­ing Chi­na. At the same time, the admin­is­tra­tion has failed to encour­age Tai­wan to sig­nif­i­cant­ly enhance its defense capa­bil­i­ties or to adopt a strat­e­gy that would make it more resilient in the face of a poten­tial Chi­nese inva­sion. This lack of clear direc­tion has left both Tai­wan and region­al allies uncer­tain about U.S. inten­tions and the cred­i­bil­i­ty of Amer­i­can deter­rence.

The Biden admin­is­tra­tion has also framed the com­pe­ti­tion with Chi­na as an ide­o­log­i­cal strug­gle between democ­ra­cy and author­i­tar­i­an­ism, which fails to address the more prag­mat­ic aspects of U.S.-China rela­tions, such as trade, tech­nol­o­gy, and mil­i­tary com­pe­ti­tion. By fram­ing the rela­tion­ship pri­mar­i­ly in ide­o­log­i­cal terms, the Unit­ed States risks alien­at­ing poten­tial part­ners in the region, such as the ASEAN coun­tries, that may not share West­ern demo­c­ra­t­ic val­ues but still view China’s rise as a threat.

In the Mid­dle East, the Biden administration’s han­dling of Iran has been par­tic­u­lar­ly lack­lus­ter. Attempts to revive the Joint Com­pre­hen­sive Plan of Action (JCPOA), com­mon­ly known as the Iran nuclear deal, were too accom­mo­dat­ing, grant­i­ng con­ces­sions with­out com­pelling the regime to curb its desta­bi­liz­ing activ­i­ties in the region. Despite reen­ter­ing the nuclear talks, Iran’s region­al influ­ence has only grown, embold­en­ing its prox­ies in Yemen, Syr­ia, Iraq, and Lebanon (the so-called “Axis of Resis­tance”). This has left the Mid­dle East in tur­moil, with Israel fac­ing an array of ene­mies. For­tu­nate­ly, in the wake of the Octo­ber 7 attack, Israel has demon­strat­ed the strength that the Biden admin­is­tra­tion has not, dec­i­mat­ing Hamas and Hezbol­lah and stand­ing tough against Iran itself.

The administration’s sim­plis­tic deter­rent strat­e­gy, encap­su­lat­ed in the sin­gle word “Don’t” regard­ing Iran’s poten­tial attacks on Israel, was pre­dictably inef­fec­tive, neces­si­tat­ing sig­nif­i­cant ongo­ing naval oper­a­tions against the Houthis to main­tain open sea lanes. Its incon­sis­tent sup­port for Israel after one of the dead­liest ter­ror­ist attacks in his­to­ry raised ques­tions about America’s com­mit­ment to its core allies. Yet, the administration’s hes­i­tant back­ing of Israel didn’t gar­ner Arab sup­port for the Unit­ed States. To the con­trary, Arab opin­ion of the Unit­ed States has plum­met­ed since Octo­ber 7, while China’s rep­u­ta­tion has soared. Specif­i­cal­ly, sur­vey polls con­duct­ed by Arab Barom­e­ter in the win­ter of 2023–24 among five diverse Arab coun­tries (Jor­dan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mau­ri­ta­nia, and Moroc­co) found that few­er than a third viewed the Unit­ed States favor­ably in four of the five coun­tries, while more than half the respon­dents in all five coun­tries held favor­able views of Chi­na. 

Last­ly, the Biden administration’s lack of clar­i­ty on Syr­ia and its post-elec­tion deci­sion to push for the fall of Bashar al-Assad fur­ther com­pli­cat­ed an already tumul­tuous sit­u­a­tion. Pres­i­dent Trump’s imme­di­ate state­ment after the fall of Assad was that “the Unit­ed States should have noth­ing to do” with the mess in Syr­ia. “This is not our fight. Let it play out. Do not get involved.” The Amer­i­can peo­ple agree with those sen­ti­ments. As Mike Waltz, Trump’s nom­i­nee for nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er, put it: “Pres­i­dent Trump was elect­ed with an over­whelm­ing man­date to not get the Unit­ed States dug into any more Mid­dle East­ern wars.”

The Biden admin­is­tra­tion has also strug­gled to enhance Euro­pean secu­ri­ty beyond the Ukraine con­flict. While the Unit­ed States has been a vocal pro­po­nent of NATO’s role in deter­ring Russ­ian aggres­sion, it has failed to address the struc­tur­al weak­ness­es with­in the alliance and the issue of bur­den-shar­ing. Despite Biden’s calls for NATO uni­ty, the Unit­ed States con­tin­ues to shoul­der the lion’s share of the finan­cial and mil­i­tary bur­den for Euro­pean secu­ri­ty. At the same time, the admin­is­tra­tion has failed to con­sid­er alter­na­tive secu­ri­ty frame­works beyond NATO. The lack of a more com­pre­hen­sive approach to Euro­pean secu­ri­ty, which includes non-NATO coun­tries and new secu­ri­ty arrange­ments, has left Europe vul­ner­a­ble to exter­nal threats and depen­dent on U.S. lead­er­ship. Soon­er than lat­er, Europe must wean itself off Amer­i­can pow­er and secu­ri­ty. Wealthy U.S. allies can­not expect Amer­i­can tax­pay­ers to con­tin­ue to foot the bill for their depen­dence on U.S. mil­i­tary pro­tec­tion in an increas­ing­ly com­pet­i­tive post-Amer­i­can world.

Domes­ti­cal­ly, Biden’s open bor­der pol­i­cy has become a sig­nif­i­cant nation­al secu­ri­ty risk, with ram­pant exploita­tion by transna­tion­al crim­i­nal orga­ni­za­tions and ter­ror­ists. This pol­i­cy has not only fueled domes­tic debates but also weak­ened America’s posi­tion on the inter­na­tion­al stage, where bor­der secu­ri­ty is linked to sov­er­eign­ty and nation­al pow­er. Biden’s inabil­i­ty to secure the bor­der has left the Unit­ed States vul­ner­a­ble to drug and human traf­fick­ing, spillover vio­lence, and oth­er transna­tion­al threats, all of which have nation­al and glob­al impli­ca­tions.

The Biden administration’s ener­gy pol­i­cy has failed to ful­ly lever­age U.S. ener­gy resources to strength­en the country’s strate­gic posi­tion. While the admin­is­tra­tion has pri­or­i­tized clean ener­gy ini­tia­tives and the tran­si­tion away from fos­sil fuels, it has neglect­ed the poten­tial of U.S. ener­gy inde­pen­dence as a tool for geopo­lit­i­cal lever­age. The deci­sion to restrict domes­tic oil pro­duc­tion and pipeline projects, while push­ing for a shift toward renew­able ener­gy, has left the Unit­ed States vul­ner­a­ble to sup­ply dis­rup­tions, espe­cial­ly as the glob­al ener­gy mar­ket remains heav­i­ly influ­enced by Rus­sia and the Per­sian Gulf. By not pri­or­i­tiz­ing ener­gy secu­ri­ty, the Biden admin­is­tra­tion has failed to coun­ter­bal­ance the influ­ence of com­peti­tors like Rus­sia, who use ener­gy exports as a geopo­lit­i­cal weapon. The soon­er the Unit­ed States can become ener­gy inde­pen­dent, the faster it can cease to be held hostage by for­eign oil pro­duc­ers.

The Biden administration’s for­eign pol­i­cy was dri­ven by ide­ol­o­gy over strate­gic prag­ma­tism, reac­tive cri­sis man­age­ment over proac­tive lead­er­ship that placed Amer­i­can inter­ests first, and a series of pol­i­cy mis­steps that have col­lec­tive­ly con­tributed to a less secure, less influ­en­tial Amer­i­ca. The administration’s approach has been more about main­tain­ing the sta­tus quo and react­ing to imme­di­ate crises—while squan­der­ing the nation’s finite resources—rather than steer­ing inter­na­tion­al rela­tions towards a coher­ent, ben­e­fi­cial end-state for U.S. inter­ests. This is much to the nation’s detri­ment and needs an imme­di­ate cor­rec­tive by the Trump admin­is­tra­tion.

The Biden admin­is­tra­tion strug­gled to main­tain a strate­gic bal­ance in key regions, notably in the Indo-Pacif­ic and Europe, where its poli­cies have been marked by incon­sis­ten­cy and a fail­ure to ful­ly address the chal­lenges of Chi­na and Rus­sia. In the Mid­dle East, the administration’s lack of a clear strat­e­gy to con­front Iran’s grow­ing influ­ence has fur­ther desta­bi­lized the region, while its response to the Israel–Palestinian con­flict has been tepid and incon­sis­tent. Domes­ti­cal­ly, poli­cies like the open bor­der ini­tia­tive have not only under­mined nation­al secu­ri­ty but have had broad­er inter­na­tion­al reper­cus­sions, as transna­tion­al crim­i­nal orga­ni­za­tions exploit the porous U.S. bor­der. Sim­i­lar­ly, the administration’s ener­gy poli­cies, aimed pri­mar­i­ly at address­ing cli­mate change, have failed to cap­i­tal­ize on America’s vast ener­gy resources, leav­ing the Unit­ed States more vul­ner­a­ble to geopo­lit­i­cal maneu­ver­ing by adver­saries like Rus­sia and the Mid­dle East.

For the new admin­is­tra­tion, Biden’s lega­cy is a stark reminder of the impor­tance of a clear, prin­ci­pled strat­e­gy in for­eign pol­i­cy. It is also a reminder that states seek­ing to thrive must first accu­rate­ly per­ceive their exter­nal envi­ron­ment. Guid­ed by a sol­id grasp of the land­scape, states can wise­ly define their core inter­ests, assess threats and oppor­tu­ni­ties, bring pow­er and com­mit­ments into bal­ance, and antic­i­pate the direc­tion and mag­ni­tude of inter­na­tion­al change. Look­ing for­ward, the incom­ing Trump admin­is­tra­tion faces the daunt­ing task of not only undo­ing this dam­age but also re-estab­lish­ing an “Amer­i­ca First” pol­i­cy that tru­ly advances U.S. nation­al inter­ests. 

Imme­di­ate steps might include rene­go­ti­at­ing what America’s allies bring to our alliances, reen­gag­ing on new terms with Chi­na and Rus­sia, secur­ing the bor­ders, and lever­ag­ing U.S. ener­gy resources for strate­gic, long-term gains. It is impor­tant to begin assess­ing the for­eign pol­i­cy fail­ures of the last four years in order to devel­op a more robust strate­gic approach for nav­i­gat­ing the com­plex­i­ties of glob­al pol­i­tics in the twen­ty-first cen­tu­ry in ways that will place the Unit­ed States back on top.

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