The Ugly Real­i­ty on the Ground in Syr­ia

The Ugly Reality on the Ground in Syria

The Ugly Real­i­ty on the Ground in Syr­ia

Cau­tion is war­rant­ed as regime ele­ments appear to par­tic­i­pate in eth­nic cleans­ing.

SYRIA-CONFLICT-RIGHTS-MINORITIES

Cred­it: Dehlil Souleiman/Getty Images

The lat­est episode of vio­lence in Syr­ia has its roots in the imme­di­ate after­math of the fall of the Assad dynasty, accord­ing to sources on the ground who spoke to The Amer­i­can Con­ser­v­a­tive. Their com­ments con­tra­dict the nar­ra­tive that rem­nants of the for­mer regime are respon­si­ble for the blood­shed. It is there­fore incum­bent upon the Unit­ed States and the West in gen­er­al to con­duct a broad, seri­ous, and unpoliti­cized assess­ment of the sit­u­a­tion, and refrain from tak­ing any steps that serve to empow­er the new regime in Dam­as­cus. In par­tic­u­lar, the U.S. must not be deceived by attempts to frame the con­flict as a means of coun­ter­ing Iran.

Many main­stream media out­lets embraced the new Syr­i­an government’s account that the recent blood­shed was in response to an ambush car­ried out by Assad loy­al­ists that led to the death of 13 mem­bers of the Syr­i­an state secu­ri­ty ser­vices near the coastal city of Latakia. This nar­ra­tive is also being prop­a­gat­ed by the expert com­mu­ni­ty in Wash­ing­ton. A pol­i­cy analy­sis by the Wash­ing­ton Insti­tute for Near East Policy—widely seen as an author­i­ta­tive voice on the Mid­dle East—faulted the State Depart­ment for not men­tion­ing that “regime rem­nants trig­gered the killing”.

Accounts from the ground, how­ev­er, tell a dif­fer­ent sto­ry. Accord­ing to a source who spoke to TAC from Latakia, the attack on the state secu­ri­ty ser­vices came after months of provo­ca­tions against the Alaw­ite sect. This, he said, includ­ed the kid­nap­ping of sol­diers that had served under the for­mer regime but had not par­tic­i­pat­ed in any attacks on civil­ians.

“Nine thou­sand mil­i­tary per­son­nel who had tak­en part in the bat­tles against ISIS, 99 per­cent of whom are Alaw­ites, were kid­napped whilst unarmed on the same day that the (for­mer) regime fell,” said the source, who request­ed not to be named for secu­ri­ty rea­sons.

The new Syr­i­an lead­er­ship, he added, did not live up to its pledge of grant­i­ng amnesty for sol­diers of the for­mer regime that had no involve­ment in acts of vio­lence against civil­ians.

Oth­er provo­ca­tions includ­ed artillery and drone attacks on rur­al impov­er­ished Alaw­ite vil­lages.

Mean­while, accord­ing to this account, no armed sup­port was pro­vid­ed by Iran or any oth­er for­eign par­ty, and the weapons used by the inhab­i­tants of the coastal areas belonged to for­mer sol­diers. Per the source, it was only after no ammu­ni­tion was left, and not because of the ambush, that pro-gov­ern­ment forces launched the crack­down.

“After those who were defend­ing their dig­ni­ty ran out of ammu­ni­tion peo­ple went back home because there is no for­eign sup­port, then every Islam­ic extrem­ist capa­ble of car­ry­ing a weapon from with­in and out­side Syr­ia pro­ceed­ed to head to the coastal areas,” the source said.

Syr­i­an author­i­ties described the vio­lence against civil­ians as iso­lat­ed inci­dents, while pledg­ing to launch a probe and hold account­able those involved in vio­la­tions.

Footage and images out of Syr­ia, how­ev­er, seem to con­tra­dict the claims of iso­lat­ed inci­dents and point to sys­tem­at­ic eth­nic cleans­ing against the Alaw­ite sect. These images—some of which were sent direct­ly to TAC—show piles of bod­ies and women mourn­ing.

The num­ber of vic­tims also indi­cates that what took place goes far beyond iso­lat­ed inci­dents. Of the more than 1,000 peo­ple killed in the blood­shed, most were Alaw­ite civil­ians. 

Even oppo­nents of the Assad regime have described what took place in terms of geno­cide. Direc­tor of the Syr­i­an Obser­va­to­ry for Human Rights Rami Abdul-Rah­man called on the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty to “dif­fer­en­ti­ate between pre­vent­ing the resur­gence of Iran and regime rem­nants and the geno­cide of Alaw­ite civil­ians.”

Most con­cern­ing for Wash­ing­ton is that the sys­tem­at­ic tar­get­ing of Alaw­ites is con­sis­tent with the goals of ISIS, which reserves a spe­cial hatred for minori­ties and Shi­ites in par­tic­u­lar. While Alaw­ites are dis­tinct from Shi­ites, they are often con­sid­ered part of the same cat­e­go­ry. Video footage and images obtained by TAC from sources in Syr­ia show mil­i­tants wear­ing a uni­form dis­play­ing the ISIS black flag sym­bol. (TAC can­not inde­pen­dent­ly ver­i­fy the authen­tic­i­ty of this footage.) The pos­si­bil­i­ty of ISIS rem­nants being absorbed into or employed by the Syr­i­an state secu­ri­ty ser­vices must there­fore be tak­en seri­ous­ly. 

The accu­mu­lat­ed evi­dence is seri­ous enough that the Trump admin­is­tra­tion should resist actions that would effec­tive­ly empow­er the new regime in Dam­as­cus, not least because this may end up empow­er­ing ISIS. Some such calls have come from promi­nent fig­ures in the Wash­ing­ton “expert com­mu­ni­ty.” 

In a recent arti­cle in For­eign Affairs, pub­lished just pri­or to the mas­sacres of the Alaw­ites, America’s for­mer ambas­sador to Dam­as­cus, Robert Ford—seen as one of Washington’s finest on Syr­i­an issues—called for team­ing up with the new Syr­i­an lead­er­ship to fight ISIS. Among the rec­om­men­da­tions put for­ward by Ford was pos­si­ble intel­li­gence coop­er­a­tion with the new HTS regime.

Aggres­sion from the Kur­dish-led Syr­i­an Demo­c­ra­t­ic Forces against Arab civil­ians, he argues, is one of fac­tors that dis­qual­i­fy the SDF from con­tin­u­ing to be Washington’s main part­ner in the fight against ISIS. On the oth­er hand, Ford paints a rather rosy pic­ture of HTS, includ­ing its treat­ment of Chris­tians in Idlib. (An agree­ment has now been reached between the new regime and the SDF to inte­grate the Kur­dish forces into the new Syr­i­an nation­al army.)

The unfor­tu­nate tim­ing of this arti­cle brings to mind the deba­cle sur­round­ing for­mer nation­al secu­ri­ty advi­sor Jake Sullivan’s rosy pic­ture of the Mid­dle East pub­lished less than a week before Hamas and oth­er Pales­tin­ian fac­tions launched Oper­a­tion Al-Aqsa Storm against Israel. Iron­i­cal­ly, Sul­li­van also made this assess­ment in For­eign Affairs.

That Ford cat­a­stroph­i­cal­ly appears to have mis­read the sit­u­a­tion is all the more rea­son why any advice from the tra­di­tion­al “expert com­mu­ni­ty” should be ignored by Trump 2.0.

It is also like­ly not lost on Syr­i­an pres­i­dent Ahmed al-Sharaa that senior Amer­i­can offi­cials have shown a ten­den­cy to tol­er­ate and even depict Salafist jihadis in Syr­ia (groups like HTS) as allies. In fact, Sharaa expe­ri­enced this first­hand when an email exchange exposed by Wik­ileaks in ear­ly 2012 revealed that Sullivan—who was a senior aide at the time to Sec­re­tary of State Hilary Clinton—opined to his boss that “Al-Qae­da is on our side in Syr­ia.” Sharaa was the leader of Al-Qae­da in Syr­ia at the time under his pseu­do­nym “Abu Moham­mad al-Jolani.”

The ratio­nale behind Sullivan’s argu­ment was a clas­sic case of “the ene­my of my ene­my is friend.” In oth­er words, Assad was the greater ene­my, and his demise, by what­ev­er force, was a good thing. The hos­til­i­ty towards Assad was large­ly due to the Assad dynasty’s long-stand­ing alliance with Iran, which remains America’s num­ber one region­al foe.

Sharaa’s appar­ent implic­it ref­er­ence to Iran­ian involve­ment in the lat­est blood­shed in Syr­ia must be met with extreme cau­tion. It would not be unrea­son­able to sus­pect that the new Syr­i­an leader may be play­ing the Iran card once more to gain the legit­i­ma­cy he is seek­ing from Wash­ing­ton, espe­cial­ly giv­en Trump’s anti-Iran­ian track record. Trump 2.0 would be wise not fall into such a trap.

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